Changes in the firms behavior after the opening of an allowance market by Mandel, Antoine
Changes in the firms behavior after the opening of an
allowance market
Antoine Mandel
To cite this version:
Antoine Mandel. Changes in the firms behavior after the opening of an allowance market.
Documents de travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2007.27 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2007.
<halshs-00155783>
HAL Id: halshs-00155783
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00155783
Submitted on 19 Jun 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Documents de Travail du
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13
http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/CES-docs.htm
ISSN : 1955-611X
Changes in the firms behavior after the opening
of an allowance market
Antoine MANDEL
2007.27
Changes in the firms behavior
after the opening of an allowance market 1
Antoine Mandel 2 3
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, UMR 8174, CNRS-Universite´ Paris 1.
Abstract
This paper focuses on the influence of the opening of a market of allowances,
such as the European Union Emission Trading Scheme, on the general equilib-
rium of an economy. Assuming there existed an equilibrium before the open-
ing of this new market, we describe the changes in the firms behavior which
guarantee that an equilibrium can be reached in the enlarged economy. The
existence of an equilibrium in this framework can then be interpreted as en-
suring the economy has the capacity to undergo the opening of a market of
allowances without too important modifications in its organisation.
Key Words: General Equilibrium Theory, Existence of Equilibrium, Exter-
nalities, Increasing Returns, Markets of allowances.
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1 Introduction
This paper proposes a general equilibrium analysis of an economy undergoing
the opening of a market of allowances. The motivation for such a study comes
from the promotion of greenhouse gases emissions trading as a key instrument
to reach the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol. A general equilibrium approach
on the issue seems necessary because the amounts of trades on emission al-
lowance markets may be large enough to influence the whole economy and
because emission trading can difficultly be considered separately from the en-
ergy markets. Also, markets of allowances maintain close relationships with
economic theory as their origin can be found in the Coase theorem.
The previous general equilibrium literature (see Laffont (18), Boyd and al. (5),
Conley and al. (9) ) has focused on the existence of equilibrium with markets
of allowances, taking the presence of such markets as a fact. We put the
emphasis on the effects of the creation of an allowance market. The opening of
new markets is a topic at the frontier of general equilibrium theory. Apart some
recent contributions in the theory of incomplete markets (see Cass and al. (6)
and Elul (12)), general equilibrium models usually consider the set of markets
is fixed. This is emphasized by the assumption of market completeness or in
the Schumpeterian analysis of economic evolution,(20), in which the opening of
new markets is one of the dynamic phenomenon occurring in between, almost
in opposition with, a sequence of general equilibria.
However, it seems to us that the actual creation of markets of greenhouse
emissions allowances, such as the European Union Emission Trading Scheme
(EUETS), raises inevitably the question of the consequences of the opening
of a new market on the existence of a general equilibrium. Taking into con-
sideration the dynamical perspective imposed by the notion of creation of
a market, we formulate our main interrogation as: “Which additional condi-
tions ensure the existence of an equilibrium in an economy with a market of
allowances knowing that there existed an equilibrium in the economy without
such a market?”
Of course, such a question is relevant only when one can not apply the standard
existence results (in our framework Bonnisseau-Cornet (3) and Jouini (16))
to the economy with an allowance market. We argue this is the case. First
it is unlikely that a global free-disposal assumption holds, because when it
wastes part of its inputs a firm may incidentally pollute. Also, firms may
suffer unbounded losses because of the cost of the allowances. Finally and
most importantly, as its market is newly opened and as its “legal essence”
makes it different from the other commodities, it seems disputable to posit
directly assumptions on the agents characteristics in the enlarged economy
which would neglect those differences.
Our analysis is conducted in a framework where the producers behavior is
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represented by general pricing rules. This allows us to encompass increasing
returns to scale as well as competitive behavior. It seems important to encom-
pass both cases as many of the firms subject to the greenhouse gases emissions
reduction schemes are in the energy sector where the presence of increasing
returns is commonly recognized and also because marginal pollution may well
be decreasing. On another hand, pricing rules provide a convenient tool to
represent changes in the firms behavior, after a slight change of perspective
on their interpretation. They are not seen as the local couterpart of a general
principle such as profit maximization or marginal pricing but rather as a set
of constraints on the acceptable prices determining locally the firms behavior.
Concerning the consumption side of the economy, the main particularity of
our model is that agents may face a negative external effect because of the
firms pollution. They can purchase allowances as a public good in order to
prevent it.
Our approach to prove the existence of an equilibrium is to posit separately
assumptions on the initial functioning of the economy and on the changes in
the firms behavior following the opening of the allowance market. First, we use
standard sufficient assumptions ( see (3) and (16)) to ensure the existence of an
equilibrium in the initial economy. Second we give conditions on the changes in
the firms behavior which ensure that a gradual increase in the allowance price
leads to a general equilibrium for arbitrary initial endowments in allowances.
Accordingly, our results link the range of initial endowments in allowances for
which there exists an equilibrium with the flexibility and the sensitivity of the
pricing rules with regards to the price of the allowance. Meanwhile we provide
a contribution to the theory of general equilibrium with increasing returns
as we indeed prove existence of equilibrium without some of the standard
assumptions such as free-disposability, bounded losses or positive values of
the pricing rules (see Jouini (17) and Giraud (14)).
2 The Model
2.1 Initial economy
We consider an initial economy 4 with a finite number L of commodities la-
beled by ` = 1 . . . L, n firms indexed by j = 1 . . . n and m consumers indexed
by i = 1 . . .m. This economy is lying within an environment whose state is
denoted by a real parameter τ ∈ R−. The state of the environment (for ex-
ample the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases) is altered by the
4 Notations: in the latter, RL++ denotes the positive orthant of R
L, RL+ its closure,
S the simplex of RL, S++ its relative interior and H the affine space it spans. Also
e denotes the vector ( 1L , . . . ,
1
L) of R
L
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production process and influences the consumers welfare. We focus on a situa-
tion where a market of allowances for environmental damages emerges whereas
firms were used to pollute freely. Our aim is to study how the firms should
then actualize their behavior in order to let a new general equilibrium come
out. We formalize the situation as follows:
The production possibilities of firms in terms of 1 to L commodities are de-
scribed by sets Yj such that:
Assumption (Initial Production (IP)) For all j,
(1) Yj is closed;
(2) 0 ∈ Yj;
(3) Yj − RL+ ⊂ Yj;
(4) If , (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1AYj and ∑nj=1 yj ≥ 0 then for all j, yj = 0.
Those assumptions are standard and ensure that, inaction is possible for every
firm, firms can freely-dispose of commodities 5 , free-production is impossible
asymptotically.
As they produce, firms influence the environment. We measure according to
the function fj : RL → R− the minimal damage caused to the environment
by firm j (we speak of minimal damage because firms may be inefficient and
pollute more than what they actually need to). The actual state of the en-
vironment when the firms choose a production scheme (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj is at
least as bad as
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) (the state of the environment is getting worse as
this parameter decreases). We assume that the pollution function satisfies the
following requirements:
Assumption (Pollution Function (PF)) For all j, fj : RL → R− is dif-
ferentiable, has values in R− and satisfies fj(0) = 0
In the initial economy, the environment has no economic value so that the
commodities prices are the only relevant variable for the firms. We let each firm
determine its choices of production according to a pricing rule φj : ∂Yj → RL+.
That is the price p ∈ RL+ of the commodities 1 to L, is acceptable for firm j
given a production plan yj ∈ Yj if p ∈ φj(yj). Such a behavior coincide with
profit maximization when the Yj are convex and φj is the normal cone to Yj.
We assume
Assumption (Initial Pricing Rules (IPR)) For all j,
(1) φj has a closed graph.
5 Under this assumption, according to lemma 5 in Bonnisseau-Cornet (3), ∂Yj can
be endowed with a manifold structure by homeomorphism with e⊥. In the latter we
will consider that this identification holds.
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(2) For all yj ∈ ∂Yj, φj(yj) is a non-empty closed convex cone 6 of RL+ dif-
ferent of {0}.
Concerning the consumers, they gain utility from the consumption of non-
negative quantities of commodities 1 to L and also are sensitive to the state of
the environment. Their preferences are represented by an utility function ui
defined on RL+ ×R which associates to a bundle, x ∈ RL+, of commodities and
to an environmental parameter τ ∈ R, an utility level ui(x, τ). Their wealth
comes from an initial endowment in commodities, ωi ∈ RL++ and from an
amount ri(pi1, . . . , pin) of the firms profits and losses (pi1, . . . , pin). The private
property case where each agent i holds a share θi,j in firm j profits is encom-
passed in this setting and will serve as a benchmark. Those characteristics are
assumed to satisfy the following assumptions:
Assumption (C) For all i,
(1) ui is quasi-concave and C
1 on RL++ × R;
(2) ui is monotonic;
(3) ∀τ ∈ R− ∀x ∈ RL+ ∀v ∈ RL+−{0} ∃k ≥ 0 such that ui(x+kv, τ) > ui(x, 0);
(4) ωi ∈ RL++;
(5) ri : RL → R is continuous and ∑mi=1 ri(pi1, . . . , pin) = ∑nj=1 pij.
All those assumptions are standard but C(3) which guarantees that a large
enough increase in the consumption of any commodity can always compensate
the deterioration of the environment. The consumers behavior is then deter-
mined by the prices p ∈ RL+ of the commodities 1 to L as they maximize the
utility they gain from consumption of those commodities, under their budget
constraint and taking the state of the environment as given.
We can then define an equilibrium of the initial economy as:
Definition 1 An equilibrium of the initial economy is a collection (p, (xi), (yj, tj))
in S++ × (RL+)m ×
∏n
j=1(Yj × R−) satisfying
(1) for every i, xi maximizes ui(·,∑nj=1 tj) in the budget set
Bi(p, (yj)) := {xi ∈ R`+ | p · xi ≤ p · wi + ri(p · yj)} ;
(2) for every j, yj ∈ ∂Yj, tj ≤ fj(yj) and p ∈ φj(yj).
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1wi.
In order to ensure that there exists such an equilibrium we posit standard
sufficient assumptions for existence of equilibrium with general pricing rules
(see (4), (16)). On the one hand,we shall assume that the producers follow the
marginal pricing rule or some pricing rule with bounded losses.
Assumption (Initial Standard Pricing Rules (ISPR)) One of the fol-
6 By cone we mean a set C such that for all c ∈ C and all λ ≥ 0 one has λc ∈ C.
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lowing holds:
(1) For all j, φj has bounded losses: there exist mj ∈ R such that if (p, yj) ∈
S × ∂Yj and p ∈ φj(yj), one has p · yj ≥ mj.
(2) For all j, φj is the marginal pricing rule given by Clarke’s Normal cone
to Yj, that is φj(yj) = NYj(yj) (see (8)).
On the other hand, a survival assumption must ensure that the economy
produces enough wealth in a sufficiently large range of situations.
Assumption (Initial Survival (IS)) For all ω′ ≥ ω, for all (p, (yj)) ∈ S×∏n
j=1 Yj such that p ∈ ∩jφj(yj) and
∑n
j=1 yj+ω
′ ≥ 0 one has p·(∑nj=1 yj+ω′) >
0.
Finally, in order to ensure each consumer receives a positive wealth, we posit:
Assumption (Initial Revenue (IR)) For all (p, (yj)) ∈ S ×∏nj=1 Yj such
that
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1 ωi ≥ 0 and p · (
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1 ωi) > 0, one has for all i,
p · ωi + ri(p · yj) > 0.
Those assumptions guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in the initial
economy in the sense of:
Theorem 1 Under assumption (IP), (PF), (C), (IPR), (ISPR), (IS) and
(IR), there exist an equilibrium in the initial economy.
Proof: Cf appendix.
One can note that if the agents wealths are set according to a private property
revenue scheme, the preceding assumptions clearly hold when the producers
are competitive (i.e profit maximizers with convex production sets). More
generally, they hold when the pricing rules are loss-free, i.e for all (p, yj) ∈
S × ∂Yj such that p ∈ φj(yj), one has p · yj ≥ 0. This encompasses the case of
marginal pricing rule when the production sets are star shaped with respect
to 0. Those particular cases are further discussed in the example section.
3 Economies with an allowance market
Let us now consider that in order to limit the environmental damages due to
production, the government forces by legal means the firms to use as input
in their production process a quantity of allowances corresponding to their
actual influence on the environment. Namely, when firm j deteriorates the
environment of tj, it must use as input a quantity tj of allowances. Mean-
while the government supplies allowances to the economy by initially allo-
cating a quantity A to consumers and producers according to the vector
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a = (a1, · · · , am, am+1, · · · , am+n) ∈ Rm+n with ∑mi=1 ai + ∑nj=1 aj = A. The
government hence limits the deterioration of the state of the environment to
the level −A. Now, this initial allocation may not be efficient and agents may
gain to trade allowances. Hence an allowance market emerges and the agents
should consequently modify their behavior.
3.1 Technical changes in the production sector
First, the relevant production set for firm j now is:
Zj := {(yj, tj) ∈ Yj × R− | tj ≤ fj(yj)}
Note that under assumptions (IP) and (PF), Zj is closed, contains 0 and
satisfies asymptotically a no free-production condition. However, given our
assumption on the pollution function, Zj does not necessarily satisfy a general
free-disposability assumption of the type Zj − RL+1+ ⊂ Zj. Indeed firms may
have to increase their use of allowance in order to dispose of their other inputs:
for example when a firm burns its waste inputs it produces CO2 emissions as
a by-product.
On another hand firms face an additional cost whose magnitude depend on
the allowance price q. Given a price (p, q) ∈ RL+1 and a production plan
(yj, tj) ∈ Zj the profit of firm j is p · yj + q(aj + tj). They should consequently
modify their pricing behavior. We shall denote by ψj : ∂Zj → RL+1 the
pricing rule adopted by firm j in the enlarged economy. Hence, the price vector
(p, q) ∈ RL+1 is acceptable for firm j given the production plan (yj, tj) ∈ ∂Zj
if and only if (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, tj).
3.2 Changes in consumers behavior
The changes which affect consumers characteristics are the modification of
their consumption set which now is RL+1+ and the modification of their revenue
induced by the initial allocation of allowances and the changes in the firms
profits. Given a production scheme (yj, tj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Zj and a price (p, q) ∈ RL+1,
the wealth distributed to consumer i now is (p, q)·(ωi, ai)+ri((p, q)·(yj, tj+aj)).
3.2.1 Private use of the allowance
Now the changes concerning properly the consumers’ behavior depend on their
access to the allowance market. If they do not have access to the market
as buyers, they behave as in the initial economy: given an environment τ ,
they maximize the utility ui(xi, τ) they gain from consumption of bundles
xi ∈ RL+ of commodities, under the budget constraint p · xi ≤ (p, q) · (ωi, ai) +
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ri((p, q) · (yj, tj + aj)). In this case, the allowance is only used by firms and
as a private good. Hence we can define an equilibrium with private use of
allowance (denoted for short private equilibrium) as:
Definition 2 A private equilibrium of the enlarged economy is a collection
((p, q), (xi), (yj, tj)) in (S
L × R+)× (RL)m ×∏nj=1 ∂Zj satisfying:
(1) for every i, xi maximizes ui(·,∑nj=1 tj) in the budget set
Bi(p, (yj)) := {xi ∈ R`+ | p · xi ≤ (p, q) · (ωi, ai) + ri((p, q) · (yj, tj + aj))};
(2) for every j, (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, tj);
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1wi;
(4)
∑m
i=1 ai +
∑n
j=1 aj +
∑n
j=1 tj = 0.
One can remark that in this framework the equilibrium state of the environ-
ment is exogenously fixed by the government through the initial allocation of
allowances at
∑m
i=1 ai +
∑n
j=1 aj. This is the situation that prevails in some
markets of allowances such as the European Union Emission Trading Scheme.
3.3 Public use of the allowance
When the consumers access to the allowance market is unrestricted, they may
purchase it in order to prevent its use by the producers and hence improve
the state of the environment. Their purchases benefit the other consumers
so that the allowance turns out to be a public good. Namely, the utility of a
consumption bundle (xi, si) ∈ RL+1+ for agent i given the quantity of allowances∑m
i=1 ai+
∑n
j=1 aj initially endowed to the economy and the quantities (sk)k 6=i
purchased by the other consumers is ui(xi,−(∑nj=1 aj +∑mi=1 ai) + (∑k 6=i sk +
si)). Given an environment −(∑nj=1 aj +∑mi=1 ai) +∑k 6=i sk, consumer i is set
to maximize the utility of its consumption bundle (xi, si) ∈ RL+1+ , under the
budget constraint p · xi + q · si ≤ (p, q) · (ωi, ai) + ri((p, q) · (yj, tj + aj)). We
then define an equilibrium with public use of the allowance (denoted for short
public equilibrium) as:
Definition 3 A public equilibrium of the enlarged economy is a collection
((p, q), (xi, si), (yj, tj)) in (S
L × R+)× (RL+1+ )m ×
∏n
j=1 ∂Zj satisfying:
(1) for every i, (xi, si) maximizes ui(xi,−(∑nj=1 aj+∑mi=1 ai)+(∑k 6=i sk+si))
in the budget set Bi(p, (yj)) := {(xi, si) ∈ RL+1+ | (p, q) · (xi, si) ≤ (p, q) ·
(ωi, ai) + ri((p, q) · (yj, tj + aj))} ;
(2) for every j, (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, tj) ;
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1wi;
(4)
∑m
i=1 si =
∑n
j=1 tj +
∑m
i=1 ai +
∑n
j=1 aj.
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4 Changes in the firms behavior and existence of equilibrium.
The existence of an equilibrium in the enlarged economy relies heavily on the
modification of the firms behavior following the opening of the allowance mar-
ket. Indeed, the producers may consider they can only handle small variation
of the quantity of pollution they cause so that an equilibrium will fail to exist
if the initial allocation of allowances is too low. Also, firms may undergo im-
portant losses because of the cost of the allowance input. This may lead the
revenue of certain consumers below 0 and hence prevent the existence of an
equilibrium.
Our aim in the following is to give conditions on the firms behavior (i.e on
the pricing rules) which are sufficient to ensure existence of equilibrium in the
enlarged economies, knowing that sufficient conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium were satisfied in the initial economy.
4.1 Stability of the initial equilibrium
First, in order to remain in a workable framework we shall assume that the
newly set pricing rule satisfy the regularity and homogeneity properties com-
monly used in the literature:
Assumption (PR)
For all j, ψj has a closed graph and convex values values in RL+1.
Note that we do not assume the enlarged pricing rules have positive values.
Indeed, the lack of free-disposability makes it doubtful that such a condition
always holds. In particular, it is not necessarily satisfied in the case of marginal
pricing ( see the examples section).
A second natural requirement concerns the compatibility of the firms behavior
with this it had in the initial economy. Indeed when the allowance price is null
it is from the firms point of view as if it was available in arbitrary high quantity,
so that they can behave as in the initial economy. Hence we state:
Assumption (Compatibility)
∀yj ∈ ∂Yj, one has {p ∈ RL | (p, 0) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj))} = φj(yj)
This implies the equilibria of the initial economy coincide with the private
equilibria of the enlarged economy with zero allowance price:
Lemma 1 Assume that for all j, ψj satisfies (Compatibility). Then (p, (xi), (yj, tj))
is an equilibrium of the initial economy if and only if there exist an allowance
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allocation ((ai), (aj)) ∈ (RL)m+n+ such that
∑n
j=1 aj+
∑m
i=1 ai+
∑n
j=1 tj ≥ 0 and
(p, 0, (xi), (yj, tj)) is a private equilibrium of the enlarged economy.
As a corollary, under (Compatibility) there can exist equilibria with improved
state of the environment (compared to the initial situation) only if firms are
ready to accept positive prices for the allowance and to modify consequently
their behavior. In this respect let us define:
Definition 4 An allowance price q is called acceptable for firm j at yj if there
exist p ∈ S++ such that (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj)).We shall denote by Qj(yj) =
{q ∈ R+ | ∃p ∈ S++ s.t (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj))} the set of allowance prices
acceptable for firm j at yj.
In order to introduce some flexibility in the firms reaction to a change in the
allowance price, we assume:
Assumption (Flexibility) For all j, for all yj ∈ ∂Yj, the set Qj(yj) is open
in R+.
Although it may not seem very demanding this assumption implies (cf. ap-
pendix) that the firms are ready to readjust in function of the allowance price,
the prices they accept for the 1 to L commodities until one of those is zero. It
holds in particular in the case of marginal pricing (cf the examples section) or
whenever the behavior of the firm is determined by some function depending
of the profit (e.g zero profit pricing rule).
This flexibility requirement ensures existence of equilibrium is locally stable
to the perturbation induced by the opening of the allowance market in the
sense of:
Theorem 2 Under assumptions (IP), (PF), (C), (IPR), (IS), (ISPR), (IR),
(PR), (Compatibility) and (Flexibility), there exists a neighborhood of zero
in R+, O, such that for every allowance price q ∈ O, there exist an initial
endowment in allowance ((ai), (aj)) ∈ Rm+n+ such that the enlarged economy
has a private equilibrium with allowance price equal to q.
Proof: Cf appendix. 7
The fact that the allowance price turns positive does not necessarily imply
that the state of the environment is improved. Indeed the initial allocation
((ai), (aj)) given by the preceding theorem may be constant for every q ∈ O.
In order to ensure the economy may undergo positive reductions of its use
of allowances, one must impose further conditions on the influence of the
allowance price on the firms behavior.
7 In fact, the flexibility assumption may here be weaken to: if 0 ∈ Qj(yj) then
Qj(yj) is a neighborhood of 0.
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4.2 On the survival assumption in the enlarged economy
A prerequisite therefore is to ensure that the economic activity remains vi-
able even though the allowance price increases significatively. The new costs
induced by the use of allowance as input may lead the firms to use less produc-
tive technology for the production of commodities. In turn, this may modify
the value of the outcome of the economic process. The economic activity as
a whole remains viable only if this value remains above zero. Mathematically,
this comes to:
Assumption (SA) For all ((p, q), (yj)) ∈ (S × R+) × ∏nj=1 ∂Yj such that∑n
j=1 yj + ω ≥ 0 and (p, q) ∈ ∩jψj(yj, fj(yj)) one has p · (
∑n
j=1 yj + ω) > 0.
This is a weak form of survival assumption as, contrary to assumption (IS)
and to the usual survival assumptions of the literature (see (4), see (3)), it
bares only on the set of attainable allocations. Hence it states that firms
do not actually choose production plans such that the aggregate wealth is
zero, whereas the usual survival assumptions (which bare on a larger set than
this of attainable allocations) posit that the firms do not choose production
plans which would, for even greater resources, lead to a null aggregate wealth.
Also note that (SA) concerns only the value of the production in terms of 1
to L commodities. The allowance does not enter into consideration here, as
at equilibrium no wealth is created or lost because of the operation of the
allowance market. The working of this market only causes lump-sum wealth
transfers.
Assumption SA suffices to guarantee that whatever the allowance price may
be, the economic process is beneficial and hence a private equilibrium may be
reached:
Theorem 3 Under assumptions (IP), (C),(PF), (IPR), (IS), (ISPR), (IR),
(PR), (Compatibility), (Flexibility) and (SA), for every non-negative allowance
price q, there exist an intial endowment in allowance ((ai), (aj)) ∈ Rm+n such
that the enlarged economy admits a private equilibrium with allowance price
equal to q.
Proof: Cf appendix.
Remark 1 Theorem 3 can be seen as a result of existence of equilibrium with
fixed price of the allowance. Existence of fixed price equilibria are usually ob-
tained (see Dre`ze (11)) by fixing constraints on supply or demand in the econ-
omy. Here the constraints bare on the initial endowments in allowance.
Let us underline a few cases where the assumption (SA) is satisfied.
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First, because of the interiority of the initial endowments, it holds whenever
the firms maintain a positive level of profit on the commodities markets:
Assumption (Enlarged Loss Free (ELF)) For all ((yj), p, q) such that
(p, q) ∈ ∩jψj(yj, fj(yj)) and ∑nj=1 yj +∑mi=1wi ≥ 0 one has p · yj ≥ 0.
If the initial pricing rules were loss free, (ELF) holds provided the firms,
which face a new cost on the allowance market, do not simultaneously accept
a diminution of their profits on the commodities markets:
Assumption (Increasing Tarification) For all ((yj), p, q) such that (p, q) ∈
∩jψj(yj, fj(yj)) and ∑nj=1 yj +∑mi=1wi ≥ 0 , for all j there exist pj0 ∈ φj(yj)
such that p‖p‖1 · yj ≥
pj0
‖pj0‖1
· yj.
When there are losses on the commodities markets, in order to ensure (SA)
holds, one must exclude explicitly the possibility of a totally inefficient aggre-
gate production:
Assumption (Minimal efficiency) For all ((yj), p, q) such that (p, q) ∈
∩jψj(yj, fj(yj)) and ∑nj=1 yj +∑mi=1wi ≥ 0 , one has ∑nj=1 yj 6∈ RL−;
and also assume the outputs are valuated at a positive price. In our framework,
this second assumption may be justified if the allowance is a necessary input
for the operation of each production technique. Indeed one can then assume
a general raise of the output prices to compensate the cost of allowance.
Assumption (Output prices Raise) For all ((yj), p, q) such that (p, q) ∈
∩jψj(yj, fj(yj)), q > 0 and ∑nj=1 yj +∑mi=1wi ≥ 0,one has:
if (
∑n
j=1 yj)h > 0 there exist j and p0 ∈ φj(yj) such that ph‖p‖1 >
(p0)h
‖p0‖1 .
(Output Price Raise), and (Minimal Efficiency) guarantee assumption SA
holds, because there always is at least an output evaluated at a positive price.
More generally if pricing rules have positive values, it suffices to assume that
the economy never wastes its entire resources (i.e for all ((yj), p, q) such that
(p, q) ∈ ∩jψj(yj, fj(yj)) and ∑nj=1 yj +∑mi=1wi ≥ 0 one has ∑nj=1 yj + ω 6= 0)
in order to ensure SA holds.
4.3 On the revenue assumption in the enlarged economy
Even-though they do not influence the aggregate wealth, transfers occurring
on the allowance market matter because of their influence on the consumers
revenue. Indeed, in order to ensure the existence of an equilibrium, one must
guarantee that each consumer receive a positive part of the aggregate wealth.
This condition may fail to hold when the losses on the allowance market are
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not well distributed. In order to prevent this failure, one can extend the initial
revenue assumption to:
Assumption (Revenue (R)) For all ((p, q), (yj)) ∈ (S × R+) × ∏nj=1 Yj
such that (p, q) ∈ ∩jψj(yj, fj(yj)), and (p, q) · (∑nj=1 yj + ∑mi=1 ωi,∑nj=1 aj +∑m
i=1 ai+
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)) > 0, one has for all i (p, q) · (ωi, ai) + ri((p, q) · (yj, aj +
fj(yj)) > 0.
This comes to consider that there exist an efficient mechanism of wealth trans-
fers which allocates the firms’ losses among consumers.
Note that the initial revenue assumption guaranteed the existence of such
a mechanism for the standard commodities markets only, what is not suffi-
cient to ensure each agent receives a positive wealth for arbitrary allocation
of allowances. Indeed consider a firm which makes a zero profit on the 1 to
L commodities market and uses large quantities of allowances, it is going to
support heavy losses when the allowance’s price raises. An agent who owns a
large share of this firm may see its revenue turn negative.
Nevertheless if the government targets precisely the needs of each firm in
allowance so that there is no trade of allowances at equilibrium (that is one has
for all j, aj = −fj(yj)), then there are no losses on the allowance market and
the initial revenue assumption is sufficient to ensure each consumer receives
a positive wealth. Hence if one wants to dispense with the enlarged revenue
assumption, one can consider in the following that the government targets
precisely the needs of each firm in allowance. Our existence results (theorems
4 and 5) then remain valid if one reads “for every aggregate level of allowance”
(allocated so that there are no losses on the allowance market) instead of “for
every initial allocation of allowance.”
4.4 Existence of Private Equilibrium for arbitrary allowance allocation
Finally, in order to obtain equilibria for arbitrary allowance allocations, the
firms behavior must be amenable enough to the allowance price. Hence we
state,
Assumption (Amenabilty) For all  > 0 there exist K ≥ 0 such that for
all (p, q, (yj)) ∈ (S × R+) × ∏nj=1 Yj satisfying ∑nj=1 yj + ω ≥ 0 , (p, q) ∈
∩jψj(yj, fj(yj)), p ∈ S++, q ≥ K,
one has for all j, fj(yj) ≥ −.
This says that when the allowance price is large enough compared to the
commodities price, the only production plans acceptable for the firms are those
which generate arbitrary low pollution and hence necessitate arbitrary low use
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of allowances as input. It entitles us to state our main results concerning the
existence of equilibrium for arbitrary initial allocations in allowances.
Theorem 4 Under assumptions (IP), (PF), (C) , (IPR), (IS), (ISPR), (IR),
(PR), (Compatibility), (Flexibility), (SA),(R) and (Amenability), for every
initial allocation of allowance ((ai), (aj)) ∈ Rm+n+ , the enlarged economy has
an equilibrium with private use of allowance.
Proof: cf. Appendix
4.5 Existence of Public equilibrium for arbitrary allowance allocation
We now turn to the existence of equilibrium with public use of the allowance.
In this framework the demand in allowance of the consumers tends to push
up the price as soon as the market opens. Hence the analogous of theorem 2
and 3 do not hold. However, one has:
Theorem 5 Under assumptions (IP), (PF), (C) (IPR), (IS), (ISPR), (IR),
(Compatibility), (Flexibility),(SA),(R) and (Amenability), for every initial al-
location of allowance ((ai), (aj)) ∈ Rm+n+ , the enlarged economy has an equi-
librium with public use of allowance.
Proof: Cf appendix.
5 Examples
We shall now discuss to which extent the results stated in the preceding sec-
tions apply to commonly used pricing rules.
5.1 Business as usual
In order to set a benchmark, let us first consider the Business as usual situ-
ation where firms do not modify their behavior following the opening of the
allowance market and where consumers do not have access to the market.
That is firms keep maximizing the profit they make on the 1 to L commodi-
ties market and then purchase the quantity of allowance they need whatever
its price may be, while consumers are only affected by wealth transfers. In
this framework all the previous assumptions but (Amenability) hold so that
there exist equilibria for every allowance price. However these equilibria in fact
coincide with those of the initial economy and require a corresponding supply
of allowances. In particular the state of the environment is not improved.
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5.2 Global Loss Free
Let us now focus on the case where pricing rules are globally loss-free in the
sense of:
Assumption (Global Loss Free) For all j, for all yj ∈ ∂Yj, for all (p, q) ∈
ψj(yj, fj(yj)), p · yj + qfj(yj) ≥ 0,
then assumption (SA) holds. Moreover (Amenability) clearly holds because
the use of a fixed positive quantity of allowance for arbitrary high allowance
price would entail losses. Hence one obtains using theorems 4 and 5 :
Corollary 1 Under assumptions (IP), (PF),(C),(IPR), (IS), (ISPR), (IR),
(PR), (Compatibility), (Flexibility), (Global Loss Free) and (R), for every ini-
tial allocation of allowance ((ai), (aj)) ∈ Rm+n+ , the enlarged economy has an
equilibrium with public (resp. private use) of allowance.
Note that this encompasses in particular the case of competitive behavior
when the Yj are convex sets containing zero and the pollution functions are
concave. That is to say when the marginal returns are decreasing and the
marginal pollution is increasing.
5.3 Marginal Pricing and Competitive Behavior
Let us now deal with the case of marginal pricing behavior. That is we consider
the firms follow the marginal pricing rule given by Clarke Normal cone (see
(8)) in the initial and in the enlarged economy. This also encompasses the case
of competitive behavior when the production sets are convex.
We restrict attention to the case where the marginal pricing rule is loss-free
in the initial economy, that is we shall posit
Assumption (Star-Shaped) For all j, Yj is 0-star-shaped.
We shall also assume that the pollution increases with the scale of production:
Assumption (Increasing Pollution) For all (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj such that∑nj=1 yj+
ω ≥ 0 (and fj(yj) < 0) the application µ→ fj(µyj) is (strictly) decreasing.
and that there exist an input whose use does not decrease the marginal pollu-
tion ( what is fairly natural as the use of additional inputs is likely to increase
pollution). In differentiable terms, the assumption is:
Assumption (Input Increase) For all j, for all yj ∈ Yj, one has ∇fj(yj) 6∈ RL−−
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This suffices to guarantee the existence of a marginal pricing equilibrium.
Corollary 2 Assume assumptions (IP),(PF), (C), (Interiority), (Star-Shaped),
(Increasing Pollution), (Input Increase) and (R) hold. If each firm follows the
marginal pricing rule then for every initial allocation of allowance ((ai), (aj)) ∈
Rm+n+ , the enlarged economy has a public (resp a private) equilibrium.
Proof: The marginal pricing rule in the initial economy is given by
φj(yj) = NYj(yj)
and satisfies assumption (IPR) and (ISPR).
As mentioned above (Star-Shaped) implies the marginal pricing rule is loss-free
in the initial economy. Together with the interiority of the initial endowments
this ensures the satisfaction of assumptions (IS) and (IR) and the existence
of a marginal pricing equilibrium in the initial economy according to theorem
1.
Now, in the enlarged economy, the marginal pricing rule is given by (see Clarke
(8)):
ψj(yj, fj(yj)) = (NYj(yj), 0)− {λ(∇fj(yj), 1)}λ≥0
and satisfies assumption (PR) as well as (Compatibility).
Due to (Increasing Pollution), one has for all (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj ∇fj(yj) · yj ≤ 0.
This implies the (Enlarged loss Free) condition and therefore SA holds.
On another hand (Input Increase) implies that whenever p ∈ S++ and (p, λ) ∈
ψ(y), there exist p0 6= 0 in NYj(yj) ∩ RL+ such that p = p0 − λ∇fj(yj). Hence
for  > 0 small enough there exist µ ≥ 0 such that µp0−(λ+)∇fj(yj) ∈ S++.
Therefore, (Flexibility) holds.
Finally, let us focus on the (Amenabiltiy) requirement. Let us consider  > 0
and (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj such that ∑nj=1 yj + ω ≥ 0 and fj(yj) ≤ −. Due to the
compacity of the set of attainable production allocation 8 , AT , one clearly has
• m = sup{∇fj(yj) · yj | (yj) ∈ AT, infj fj(yj) ≤ −} < 0, thanks to (In-
creasing Pollution)
• M = sup{∑nj=1 ‖yj‖ | (yj) ∈ AT} is bounded.
Let λ ≥ −2M
m
. Now, assume there exist p ∈ S++ such that (p, λ) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj)).
One has p+λ∇fj(yj) ∈ NYj(yj), but (p+λ∇fj(yj)) · yj ≤M +λm < 0 which
contradicts the fact that the marginal pricing rule on Yj is loss-free. Hence the
(Amenability) assumption holds.
8 See the appendix, section “Equilibrium Correspondence” for a proper definition.
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All the necessary assumptions for theorems 4 and 5 hold. It suffices to apply
those results to end the proof.
Similar results holds for arbitrary pricing rules whenever the Star − Shaped
assumption is replaced by the assumption that the initial pricing rules φj are
loss free and when the pricing rules of the enlarged economy are obtained by
adding the marginal cost of the allowance used as input in the production
process to the initial pricing rules. Namely, one has:
Corollary 3 Assume assumptions (IP ),(C), (PF ), (IPR), (Increasing Pol-
lution) and (Input Increase) hold. If the initial pricing rules φj are loss-free
and the pricing rules in the enlarged economy are of the form
ψj(yj, fj(yj)) = (φj(yj), 0)− {λ(∇fj(yj), 1)}λ≥0,
then for every initial allocation of allowance ((ai), (aj)) ∈ Rm+n+ , the enlarged
economy has a public (resp a private) equilibrium.
6 Appendix, proofs
6.1 Foreword
In order to prove existence of an equilibrium in the enlarged economy we can
not use the seminal literature on increasing returns (among others (3) and
(16)) because of the presence of externalities, the lack of free-disposability
in the production process, the value of the enlarged pricing rules outside the
positive orthant (e.g in the case of marginal pricing), and also because losses
on the allowance market may be unbounded. Nevertheless it is easy to obtain
an existence result in the initial economy. Our approach then is to perturb
the equilibrium correspendence of the initial economy in a way such that
new zeroes correspond to equilibria of the enlarged economies. We then use
invariance properties of the degree (see Cellina (7)) in order to show that there
actually exist such equilibria.
6.2 Characterization of consumers behavior
Let us first define the consumers demands. We consider the demand of agent
i in the enlarged economy when the allowance consumption is restricted at a
certain level H ≥ 0 :
Definition 5 The demand of agent i, ∆Hi : R− × (S++×]− 1,+∞[)×R+ →
RL+1, is the correspondence which associates to a collection (τ, (p, q), w) of
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environment, prices and wealth the set of elements:
∆Hi (τ, (p, q), w) = {(xi, si) ∈ RL+×[0, H] | ui(xi, τ+si) = max
Bi((p,q),w)
ui(xi, τ+si)}
where Bi((p, q), w) = {(xi, si) ∈ RL+ × [0, H] | p · xi + q · si ≤ w}.
The restriction of allowance consumption below H is a technical trick to be
able to deal simultaneously with public and private use of allowance. In par-
ticular when H = 0, ∆0i is the consumer demand in the initial economy (and
at a private equilibrium). This restriction also makes it licit to define the de-
mand for negative allowance prices (the use of negative allowance price also is
a technical trick which ensure that the equilibria with zero allowance price do
not lie on the boundary of the domain of the equilibrium correspondence). Un-
der assumption C, Berge’s maximum theorem ensures that ∆Hi is well defined
and upper-semi-continuous. Moreover thanks to assumption C(3) it satisfies
the following boundary condition:
For all τ , for all ((pn, qn), wn) converging to (p, q, w) such that w > 0 and
p ∈ ∂S one has for all i, limn ‖projRL((∆Hi (τ, (pn, qn), wn))‖ = +∞.
The wealth of agent i, given prices (p, q) ∈ (S×]−1,+∞[), production choices
(yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj and an initial allocation ((ai), (aj)) ∈ Rn+m+ of allowances is
wi((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) = (p, q) · (ωi, ai) + ri((p, q) · (yj, fj(yj) + aj)).
As this wealth may fail to be positive at some point we introduce following
lemma 2 in Jouini (16) auxiliary income functions, in order to be able to define
the equilibrium correspondence on a sufficiently large set.
Lemma 2 Let V = {((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) ∈ S++×]− 1,+∞[)×∏nj=1 ∂Yj ×
Rm+ × Rn+ | (p, q) · (
∑n
j=1 yj + ω,
∑m
i=1 ai +
∑n
j=1 aj +
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)) > 0}
there exist functions r˜i : V → R such that for all ((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) ∈ V ,
(1)
∑m
i=1 r˜i((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) = (p, q)·(
∑n
j=1(yj, aj+fj(yj))+(ω,
∑m
i=1 ai));
(2) for all i, r˜i((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) > 0;
(3) if for all i, wi((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) > 0 then for all i, wi((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) =
r˜i((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)).
Proof: It suffices to set following (16), for all ((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) ∈ V :
r˜i((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) = (1− θ(w))
∑m
i=1wi
m
+ θ(w)wi
where w = (wi) = wi((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj))
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and θ(w) =

1, if for all i wi > 0
∑m
i=1
wi∑m
i=1
wi−m infi wi , otherwise
6.3 Proof of theorem 1
We can then characterize the equilibria of the initial economy through the
correspondence E0 defined on {(p, (xi), (yj)) ∈ S++ × (RL)m × ∏nj=1 ∂Yj |
p · (∑nj=1 yj +∑mi=1 ωi) > 0} by E0(p, (yj)) =
(proje⊥(
m∑
i=1
xi−
n∑
j=1
yj−
m∑
i=1
ωi), (xi, 0)−∆0i (
n∑
j=1
fj(yj), (p, 0), r˜i((p, 0), (yj), (0), (0)), (φj(yj)−p)).
where for all j and all yj ∈ ∂Yj, φj(yj) := φj(yj) ∩ S.
It is a direct consequence of 4.3 in (19) that under assumptions (IP), (PF),
(C), (IPR), (IS) and (IR) the zeroes of E0 coincide with the set of equilibria
of the initial economy and that the degree of this correspondence is non-zero.
Hence, there exist equilibria in the initial economy. This proves theorem 1.
6.4 Parametrization by the allowance market
The opening of the allowance market influences the commodities markets in
two principal ways. First, the firms modify their pricing behavior in function of
the allowance price, second the consumers wealth is modified by the transfers
taking place on the allowance market. Those influences might be represented
as parameters influencing the equilibrium on the commodities markets. We
study in the following an equilibrium correspondence hence parametrized .
The initial allocation of allowances for which there exist an equilibrium are
then determined endogenously as the allocations which clear the allowance
market for some values of the parameters.
The parameter influencing the firms pricing rules is the allowance price. How-
ever, we would like to define parametrized pricing rules for every non-negative
real number (even if this number is not an admissible allowance price for the
firm). Therefore we have to use the following trick. We set for λ ≥ 0 and
yj ∈ ∂Yj :
• γj(λ, yj) = sup{q ≤ λ | ∃p ∈ S s.t (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj))}
• φj(λ, yj) = {p ∈ S | (p, γj(λ, yj)) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj))}
• ψj(λ, yj) = (φj(λ, yj), γj(λ, yj)).
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The value of γj(λ, yj) coincide with the allowance price whenever the pricing
rule indeed admits λ as a possible value for the allowance price in yj. Oth-
erwise it is equal to the largest admissible allowance price below λ. Such an
element exists thanks to assumption (Compatibility) and because ψj has a
closed graph. The assumption (PR) also implies that φj and ψj are s.c.s with
non-empty convex compact values.
Concerning the influence of the allowance market on the consumers wealth,
one can not represent it using the initial allocation of allowances as a pa-
rameter because this allocation must be endogenously determined. However
at equilibrium the quantity of allowances used in the economy must be equal
to the initial allocation. Hence in order to endogenize the wealth transfers
taking place on the allowance market, we implement fictive initial alloca-
tions in allowances as functions of the quantities of allowances used by the
agents. Namely, we consider continuous mappings α : Rm+n → Rm+n+ such
that
∑m
i=1 αi((si), (tj)) +
∑n
j=1 αj((si), (tj)) ≡
∑m
i=1 si +
∑n
j=1 tj, and we inter-
pret (αi(si, tj), αj(si, tj)) as the quantity of allowances allocated to consumers
and producers when ((si), (tj)) are the quantity of allowances used by pro-
ducers and consumers respectively. Using such a representation, the demands
(xi, si) of consumers correspond to as situation where the transfers on the
allowance market are balanced if and only if, (xi, si) ∈ ∆Hi (
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) −
si, p, q, r˜i((p, q), (yj), (αi(fj(yj), (si))), (αj(fj(yj), (si)))). In the following, we
shall abusively let ∆α,Hi ((p, q), (yj), si) stand for ∆
H
i (
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) − si, p, q,
r˜i((p, q), (yj), (αi(fj(yj), si)), (αj(fj(yj), si)))).
6.5 Equilibrium Correspondence
Under assumptions (IP) and (C), the set of attainable commodities alloca-
tion, {((xi), (yj)) ∈ (RL+)m ×
∏n
j=1 Yj |
∑m
i=1 yj +
∑m
i=1 ωi =
∑m
i=1 xi} is com-
pact. Hence there exist a compact ball K of RL such that Km+n contains it
in its interior. Let us set U = {((p, q), (xi, si), (yj)) ∈ (S++×] − 1,+∞[) ×
(int(K)×]− 1, H + 1[)m ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj | p · (yj + ω) + q∑mi=1 si > 0},
We can now define an equilibrium correspondence parametrized by (α, λ,H)
by setting: F
(α,λ,H)
1 : U → e⊥ × R× (RL+1)m × (e⊥)n equal to
(proje⊥(
m∑
i=1
xi −
n∑
j=1
yj − ω), q − λ, (∆α,Hi ((p, q), (yj), si)− (xi, si)), φj(λ, y)− p)
F1 is an equilibrium correspondence in the sense of the following lemma:
Lemma 3 Assume (IP), (PF), (C), (IPR), (IS), (IR), (PR) (Compatibility)
and (Flexibility) holds. Let ((p, q), (yj), (xi), (si)) ∈ (F (α,λ,H)1 )−1(0, 0, 0, 0), such
that wi((p, q), (yj), αi(fj(yj), si), αj(fj(yj), si)) > 0. One has:
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(1) if H = 0, ((p, q), (xi), (yj, fj(yj))) is a private equilibrium for the initial
allocation of allowances (αi(fj(yj), 0), αj(fj(yj), 0)), and q = λ.
(2) if si < H, ((p, q), (xi, si), (yj, fj(yj))) is a public equilibrium for the initial
allocation of allowances (αi(fj(yj), si), αj(fj(yj), si)), and q = λ.
Proof: Indeed let us consider ((p, q), (xi, si), (yj)) ∈ (F (α,λ,H)1 )−1(0, 0, 0, 0).
Let us first show that for all j, (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj)). First one clearly has
q = λ ≥ 0 and hence p ∈ φj(q, yj). Assume (p, q) 6∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj)). Un-
der Compatibility and (PR), the only possibility is that q > γj(q, yj) and
(p, γj(q, yj)) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj)). As p ∈ S++, assumption (Flexibility) then im-
plies there exist q1 such that q > q1 > γj(q, yj) and (p, q1) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj)). This
contradicts the definition of γj(q, yj). Hence one has (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj)).
As consumer i demand of allowances is equal to si and one always has
∑m
i=1 αi(fj(yj), si)+∑n
j=1 αj(fj(yj), si) =
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) +
∑m
i=1 si, the allowance market is clear pro-
vided the initial allocation is equal to (αi(fj(yj), si), αj(fj(yj), si)).
Now, one has proje⊥(
∑m
i=1 xi −
∑n
j=1 yj −
∑m
i=1 ωi) = 0. Walras law and clear-
ance of the allowance market then imply clearance of the 1 to L commodities
markets.
Now, as wi((p, q), (yj), αi(fj(yj), si), αj(fj(yj), si)) > 0, the auxiliary incomes
coincide with the original ones and hence the auxiliary demand coincide with
the original demand of consumer i when its consumption of allowance is re-
stricted below H.
Finally, if H = 0 the demand in allowance coincides with this at a private
equilibrium of the economy.
If si < H, it coincides with this at a public equilibrium of the economy.
6.6 Main Lemma
The proofs of theorems 2 to 5 are based on the following lemma which shows
that the degree of F1 can be related to the degree of the initial equilibrium
correspondence. Indeed, given (α, λ,H) let us consider the family of corre-
spondences F
(α,λ,H)
t : U → e⊥ × R× (RL+1)m × (e⊥)n defined by
(proje⊥(
m∑
i=1
xi −
n∑
j=1
yj − ω), q − tλ, (∆α,tHi ((p, q), (yj), si)− (xi, si)), φj(tλ, y)− p)
Now, it is clear that under (Compatibility), ((p, q), (xi, si), (yj)) ∈ (F (α,λ,H)0 )−1(0, 0, 0, 0)
if and only if q = 0, si = 0 for all i and (p, (xi), (yj)) is a zero of E0. Moreover
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it is clear that whatever may (α, λ,H) be the degree of F
(α,λ,H)
0 is equal to
this of E0 and hence is non-zero according to the proof of theorem 1.
Finally we show the degree of F0 is equal to this of F1.
Assume
Assumption (SAλ) For all µ ∈ [0, λ], for all (p, (yj)) ∈ S ×∏nj=1 ∂Yj such
that
∑n
j=1 yj + ω ≥ 0 and p ∈ ∩jφj(µ, y) one has p · (
∑n
j=1 yj + ω) > 0,
then
Lemma 4 Under assumption (IP), (PF),(C),(IPR), (IS), (ISPR), (IR), (PR),
(Compatibility), (Flexibility) and (SAλ), deg(F
(α,λ,H)
0 , (0, 0, 0, 0)) = deg(F
(α,λ,H)
1 , (0, 0, 0, 0).
Proof: Let λ such that SAλ holds. For sake of clarity let us denote Ft instead
of F
(α,λ,H)
t . It is clear that Ft defines an homotopy between F0 and F1. Let us
show that the set ∪t∈[0,1]F−1t (0) is compact. The homotopy invariance property
of the degree then implies the result (see (7)).
Indeed consider a sequence (pn, qn, (xni , s
n
i ), (y
n
j )) ∈ ∪t∈[0,1]F−1t (0, 0, 0, 0). For
all n, there exist tn such that F(tn)(p
n, qn, (xni , s
n
i ), (y
n
j )) = 0.
By construction the transfers on the allowance market are balanced. Hence,
using Walras one obtains that
∑m
i=1 x
n
i −
∑n
j=1 y
n
j − ω = 0. Therefore for
all n ,((xni ), (y
n
j )) lies in the set of attainable allocations which is compact.
Moreover one has tn ∈ [0, 1], pn ∈ S, qn ∈ [−1, λ], sni ∈ [−,H + ]. Hence
(tn, (xni , s
n
i ), (y
n
j ), p
n, qn, ) lie in a compact set and hence has a subsequence
converging to (t, (xi, si), (yj), p, q) where t ∈ [0, 1], xi ∈ K and si ∈ [0, H],∑n
j=1 yj + ω =
∑m
i=1 xi ≥ 0, (p, q) ∈ S × [−1,+∞[.
It remains to show that (p, q, (xi, si), (yj)) ∈ U and that Ft(p, q, (xi, si), (yj)) =
(0, 0, 0, 0).
First as ((xi), (yj)) is an attainable allocation, one has xi ∈ int(K).
Second as ∆Hi has values in RL× [0, H] it is clear that si ∈ [0, H] ⊂]−,H+[.
Third as q = tλ ≥ 0 one clearly has q > −1.
Fourth as φj is s.c.s, one has for all j p ∈ φj(tλ, yj) and as
∑n
j=1 yj+ω ≥ 0, as-
sumption SAλ implies that p·(∑nj=1 yj+ω) > 0. Hence (p, q, (yj), αi((fj(yj)), (si)),
αj((fj(yj)), (si))) ∈ V and the auxiliary individual income, r˜i, all are strictly
positive. Given the fact that xni is bounded, the boundary condition on the
demand then implies that p ∈ S++.This proves that (p, q, (xi, si), (yj)) ∈ U.
Given the continuity properties of Ft and ∆i, one then has (xi, si) ∈ ∆i(p, q, (yj), si)
for all i and Ft((yj), p, q, (si)) = 0. This ends the proof.
22
6.7 Proof of theorem 2
Given the compactness of the attainable allocations and the s.c.s of the pric-
ing rules, it is clear that assumption (SAλ) holds for all λ in a neighbor-
hood of zero. Hence one has according to lemma 4 that for all (α,H) and
for λ in a neighborhood of zero, deg(F
(α,λ,H)
1 ) is non-zero. Let us then set
αj(fj(yj), si) = fj(yj) and αi ≡ 0 . For such an α assumptions (SAλ) and
(IR) imply that for all ((p, q), (xi, si), (yj)) ∈ (F (α,λ,H)1 )−1(0, 0, 0, 0), one has
wi((p, q), (yj), αi(fj(yj), si), αj(fj(yj), si)) > 0. It then suffices to apply lemma
3 to end the proof.
6.8 Proof of theorem 3
Assumption SA implies SAλ holds for all λ ≥ 0. Now if one chooses α as in
the proof of theorem 2, it is clear that for all λ, for all ((p, q), (xi, si), (yj)) ∈
(F
(α,λ,H)
1 )
−1(0, 0, 0, 0), one has wi((p, q), (yj), αi(fj(yj), si), αj(fj(yj), si)) > 0.
It then suffices to apply lemma 3 to end the proof.
6.9 Connectedness Lemma
In order to prove theorems 4 and 5 we shall use the following lemma. Under
assumption SA, lemma 4 implies that for all (λ, α,H) the degree of F
(α,λ,H)
1
is non-zero. For a given λ, let us consider the family of correspondences Gt =
F
(α,tλ,H)
1 and let f be a continuous function on U .
Lemma 5 Assume there exist b > a reals such that infη∈G−10 (0) f(η) = b and
supη∈G−11 (0) f(η) = a. Then for all c ∈ [a, b] there exists t ∈ [0, 1] and η ∈
G−1t (0) such that f(η) = c.
Proof: Assume this does not hold, that is there exists c ∈ [a, b] such that ∀t ∈
[0, 1], ∀η ∈ G−1t (0) f(η) 6= c. Let then a1 = sup{z ≤ b | z 6∈ f(∪t∈[0,1]G−1t (0)}.
As ∪t∈[0,1]G−1t (0) is compact in U and f is continuous one has a1 ∈ f(∪t∈[0,1]G−1t (0))
Hence there must exist a2 < a1 such that [a2, a1[∈ (f(∪t∈[0,1]G−1t (0))c.
Let V = U ∩ f−1]a2,+∞[. V is an open set such that G−10 (0) ⊂ V and
∪t∈[0,1]G−1t (0)∩∂V = ∅. This implies first that deg((G0)|V , 0) = deg((G0), 0) 6=
0. Second it implies that ∪t∈[0,1]((Gt)|V )−1(0) is compact in V. Using conserva-
tion of the degree by homotopy, one gets deg((G1)|V , 0) = deg((G0)|V , 0) 6= 0
This contradicts the fact that every zero η of G1 satisfies f(η) ≤ a and hence
belongs to V c.
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6.10 Proof of theorem 4
Let us show that there exist a private equilibrium for every initial endowment
in allowance a ∈ Rn+m+ . Therefore, let us set αj(fj(yj), si) = aj∑m
i=1
ai+
∑n
j=1
aj
(
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)+∑m
i=1 si) and αi(fj(yj), si) =
ai∑m
i=1
ai+
∑n
j=1
aj
(
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) +
∑m
i=1 si). Under as-
sumption (R) and (SA) it is clear that for such an α, for all λ, for all ((p, q), (xi, si), (yj)) ∈
(F
(α,λ,H)
1 )
−1(0, 0, 0, 0), one has wi((p, q), (yj), αi(fj(yj), si), αj(fj(yj), si)) > 0.
So as in the proof of theorem 3 there exist a private equilibrium for all non-
negative allowance price λ with an initial allocation of allowance made ac-
cording to α, that is proportional to ((ai), (aj)). It then remains to show that
there exist an equilibrium with aggregate allowance supply exactly equal to∑m
i=1 ai +
∑n
j=1 aj.
Now wether
∑m
i=1 ai +
∑n
j=1 aj ≥ a := inf{
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) | (p, (xi), (yj)) equilib-
rium of the initial economy } and the proof is straightforward using lemma
1 and free-disposability of the allowance. More generally one can state there
exist equilibria for every allowance allocation proportional to ((ai), (aj)) and
whose sum is in [a,+∞[.
Now wether a = 0 and the proof is complete wether a > 0. In this case,
let us consider  such that a >  > 0 and λ the corresponding bound on
allowance price given by assumption (Amenabilty). Considering the family of
applications Gt = F
(α,tλ,0)
1 , one has supx∈G−11 (0)
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) ≤ . Hence one can
apply the preceding lemma to the function
∑n
j=1 fj in order to show that for
every c ∈ [, a] there exist t ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ G−1t (0) such that ∑nj=1 fj(yj) =
c. Hence there exist equilibria in the enlarged economy for every allowance
allocation proportional to ((ai), (aj)) and whose sum is in [, a]. As this holds
for all  > 0 the proof is complete.
6.11 Proof of theorem 5
Let us show that there exist a public equilibrium for every initial endow-
ment in allowance a ∈ Rn+m+ . Let us consider α as in the proof of theorem 4,
H > 0 ,λ > 0, and the corresponding family of applications Gt = F
(α,tλ,H)
1 .
Given the continuity of the marginal utility of the environment , for λ suf-
ficiently high none of the consumers actually purchase allowance at equi-
librium. Together with assumption (Amenability,) this implies that for λ
high enough the total demand in allowance is below . Similar arguments
to those in the proof of theorem 4 then imply that for every allowance allo-
cation of the form k((ai), (aj)), there exist a zero of some F
(α,tλ,H)
1 such that∑n
j=1 fj(yj)+
∑m
i=1 si = k(
∑m
i=1 ai+
∑n
j=1 aj). Now, according to lemma 7 such
a zero is a public equilibrium if for all i, si < H. A sufficient condition there-
24
fore is that
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) +
∑m
i=1 si < H. As the preceding holds for arbitrary
H, the proof is complete.
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